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DEMOCRACY AND THE DEATH OF KNOWLEDGE
Suzanna Sherry*
Judges are under unprecedented attack in the United States. As
former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote in the Wall Street Journal
last month, "while scorn for certain judges is not an altogether new
phenomenon, the breadth and intensity of rage currently being leveled at
Popular
the judiciary may be unmatched in American history."'
unhappiness with particular decisions-which began even before the
Constitution and has occurred continuously since then-has turned into
something deeper: a rejection of judicial review itself and a belief that
judges should bow to the wishes of the popular majority.
A few years ago, I diagnosed this phenomenon as the result of a
misconception that all law is politics. I suggested that it was now
conventional wisdom to believe that "constitutional adjudication is
simply politics by another name.",2 And because politics is the province
of the people and their representatives, judges should stay out of it.
According to this conventional wisdom, judicial review is
democratically illegitimate.
I was wrong-not about the problem, but about its source. The
explanation for the attack on the judiciary runs much deeper than a
failure to separate politics from law. It is part of a larger phenomenon:
We have begun to conflate politics and knowledge. In the name of
democracy, we have jettisoned the role of experts and expertise.
The problem takes a variety of different forms. First, there are claims
that knowledge ought to be democratically created: What a majority of
people believe is true ought to be considered true, regardless of the
validity of the belief under scientific, empirical, historical, or other
principles.
Here, manufactured knowledge bubbles up from the
democratic base and actual knowledge withers. Second, people may
have an illusion of their own expertise where it does not exist, and make
faulty decisions for that reason. This is a substitution of ill-informed
popular opinion for expertise, related to but different from the direct
* Herman 0. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I thank Lisa Bressman,
Paul Edelman, Chris Guthrie, and Owen Jones for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. Sara
Broach provided excellent research assistance. This paper was presented as the Fall Semester 2006
William Howard Taft Lecture at the University of Cincinnati College of Law on November 9, 2006.
1. Sandra Day O'Connor, The Threat to Judicial Independence, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at
A 18, available at http://www.opinionjoumal.com/extra/?id=l 10009019.
2. Suzanna Sherry, Politics and Judgment, 70 Mo. L. REV. 973, 975 (2005).
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democratic creation of knowledge. Third, actual knowledge may
become irrelevant to decision-making, so that only politics matters.
Knowledge dies because it is entirely displaced.
All three of these phenomena are part of what I am calling the flight
from expertise and the democratization of knowledge. They share a
common irony and a common consequence. The irony is that it is
paradoxical to be fleeing expertise at precisely the time that expertise
(especially scientific expertise) is the deepest and most specialized that it
has ever been. It is thus more difficult than ever for most of the
population to acquire sufficient knowledge to make informed decisions
on a broad range of questions. But-and here is the common
consequence-if the knowledge of experts is no more valid than the
beliefs of the populace, then expertise cannot serve as a legitimate
reason for placing some types of decisions in the hands of experts rather
than the general public. We therefore see an increased demand for
popular decision-making in contexts that we previously left to experts.
My goal in this lecture is to catalogue this blurring of the line between
knowledge and democratic politics, to explore its possible origins, and to
explain why I believe that it is pernicious.
Before I turn to some legal illustrations of the democratization of
knowledge, let me begin with two paradigmatic examples from popular
culture. First, consider Wikipedia. (For those of you who are dinosaurs
like me-and do not have teenage children to keep you informed of such
things-Wikipedia is an on-line encyclopedia, but with a twist: Anyone
can add to or change the information contained in an entry. If disputes
arise, there are various ways to resolve them. Most of the disputeresolution methods are more or less democratic, and although a few of
the methods involve designated decision-makers, none seem to rely on
the opinions of recognized experts. 3)
Wikipedia illustrates two different aspects of the relationship between
democracy and knowledge. Because it is freely available over the
Internet, Wikipedia is an example of the democratic availability of
knowledge: Everyone can easily obtain information on a broad variety
of subjects. This is what is sometimes meant by the democratization of
knowledge, and it is undeniably beneficial. A little knowledge may be a
dangerous thing, but we should applaud any innovation that allows more
people access to knowledge.

3. Wikipedia says that it "works by building consensus," and that "[t]o develop a consensus on
a disputed topic, you may need to expose the issue to a larger audience." Wikipedia: Resolving
Disputes, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Resolvingdisputes, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
WP:Resolvingdisputes (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
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But Wikipedia-and its democratization of knowledge-has a dark
side as well. With the general public rather than experts as the source of
(and primary check on) Wikipedia's content, misinformation is bound to
creep in. Often, the misinformation is deliberate. Political satirist
Stephen Colbert, for example, urged viewers of his television show, The
Colbert Report, to edit the Wikipedia entry on elephants to state that the
elephant population has tripled in the last six months. As he jokingly
described Wikipedia's democratic process, "all we need to do is
convince a majority of people that some factoid is true. 'A That is, in
fact, a reasonably accurate description of both Wikipedia and the
phenomenon that I am discussing.
If the democratic creation of knowledge can be amusing, however, it
can also be chilling. John Seigenthaler Sr. is a respected journalist, a
former newspaper editor, a friend of and pallbearer for Robert F.
Kennedy, and the founder of the First Amendment Center, a think tank
for the study of free speech. (He is also the father of NBC news anchor
John Seigenthaler.) For four months, Seigenthaler's biography on
Wikipedia also included statements that he had lived in the Soviet Union
from 1971 to 1984, and that "he 'was thought to have been directly
involved in the Kennedy assassinations of both John and his brother
Bobby." 5
Needless to say, neither of these last two statements is true. They
were posted by an anonymous contributor, and were not removed until
Seigenthaler himself complained directly to the operator of the web
site.6 One of Wikipedia's volunteer editors had even edited the entry to
correct a misspelling, but no one had seen fit to correct the outright
falsehoods.7 Such are the consequences of replacing expertise with
popular input.
Lest you dismiss Wikipedia as a technoid aberration, let me suggest a
more mundane example of the democratization of knowledge. Once
upon a time we left medical practice to experts, including doctors. They
diagnosed what was wrong with us and prescribed drugs to treat it.
4. The video clip was available at Youtube.com, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
zmHm0rGns41 (last visited Oct. 5, 2006). It has since been removed to avoid copyright problems. Of
course, since he suggested this on national television, Wikipedia blocked these particular edits.
5. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Rewriting History; Snared in the Web of a Wikipedia Liar, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at 41; John Seigenthaler, A False Wikipedia "Biography,'"USA TODAY, Nov. 30,
2005, at I IA; John Seigenthaler, Truth Can be at Risk in the World of the Web, TENNESSEAN, Dec. 4,
2005, at 15A (clarification added Dec. 7 on p. 2A).
6. The contributor later came forward and apologized to Seigenthaler. See Katharine Q. Seelye,
A Little Sleuthing Unmasks Writer of Wikipedia Prank, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at 151. Seigenthaler
had tried to discover the identity of the contributor but had been stymied by federal privacy laws. See
Seigenthaler, Truth Can be at Risk, supra note 5.
7. See Seigenthaler, Truth Can be at Risk, supra note 5.
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Medical professionals were-and still are-the only ones with the
power to authorize the use of prescription drugs. But the diagnosis of
illness and the preliminary determination of appropriate treatment have
been democratized.
Drug manufacturers now advertise their prescription drugs in the
popular media, describing the symptoms of-and pushing their cure
for-everything from heart disease and depression to toenail fungus and
"restless leg syndrome." The drug companies are essentially trying to
create in their audience an illusion of expertise. And people must be
buying it, because otherwise these ads would not be proliferating at such
a dizzying rate. Like Wikipedia, pharmaceutical advertising is not all
positive: Some studies have concluded that it is one factor in the rising
cost of prescription drugs and that it also has negative effects on the
practice of medicine.8
Wikipedia and drug advertising are just two examples of how the
expansion of democratic ideals into the domain of knowledge has
diminished the role of experts. In both cases, the democratization of
knowledge has led to unanticipated negative consequences. One lesson
I take from these examples-a point to which I will return later-is that
we should be cautious about abandoning expertise in favor of popular
opinion.
Other legal scholars have apparently missed this lesson. The
democratizing spirit has invaded the realm of legal knowledge, and it is
not a pretty picture. In at least three different doctrinal areasconstitutional law, administrative law, and, most recently, civil
procedure-prominent scholars are urging that expert decision-making
be replaced with democracy. After briefly surveying this scholarship, I
will talk a bit about the origins of the flight from expertise and then
return to the underlying normative question: Is there such a thing as too
much democracy?
Let us begin with constitutional law, and the movement toward
"popular constitutionalism." This is part of the phenomenon that Justice
O'Connor was lamenting. She was referring primarily to politicians and
pundits, but I want to focus instead on legal scholarship.
8. See, e.g., Michele L. Creech, Make A Runfor the Border: Why the United States Government
Is Looking to the InternationalMarketfor Affordable PrescriptionDrugs, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 593

(2001); Andrew Harris, Note, Recent Congressional Responses to Demands for Affordable
Pharmaceuticals,16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 219 (2004); Peter H. Stone, PhRMA Fights Back, NAT'L
J., Jul. 21, 2001, at 2314; Spencer Swartz, FDA Big FactorBehind High US Drug Costs-Economist,
FORBES.COM, Jan. 27, 2004, http://www.forbes.com/home-europe/newswire/2004/01/27/
rtr1230471 .html; Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-To-ConsumerPrescriptionDrug Advertising, 25 AM. J. L.
& MED. 149 (1999); Robert Steyer, Do Drug Ads Educate or Mislead Consumers? ST. LOUIs POSTDISPATCH, June 20, 1999, at A9.
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It is a truism that our constitutional system includes what Alexander
Bickel some forty years ago labeled the "countermajoritarian
difficulty." 9 Unelected federal judges have the power to invalidate laws
enacted by state and federal legislatures. Bickel himself, who lived in an
age when expertise still mattered, resolved the dilemma by recognizing
that judges and legislatures perform different functions. Legislatures
represent the people, and judges are experts in legal interpretationincluding constitutional interpretation. (Bickel and his followers had a
lot more to say about the judicial function, but that is a different lecture.)
Many prominent contemporary constitutional scholars, however, have
turned Bickel's idea of a countermajoritarian judiciary into a rejection of
judicial review, contending that the Constitution should be interpreted
by the people and their representatives rather than by the courts. The
titles of two recent books should give you a flavor of the popular
constitutionalists'
claims:
The
People
Themselves:
Popular
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, by Larry Kramer (Dean of the
Stanford Law School), and Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts, by Mark Tushnet (a professor at the Harvard Law School).' 0
Other scholars-including Professor Barry Friedman in his Taft
lecture three years ago-have suggested that we have no
countermajoritarian difficulty
because judges already follow the wishes
I
of the popular majority.
Both these groups of constitutional scholars are necessarily rejecting
the premise that judges perform a specialized function as experts in the
interpretation of law. Instead, they suggest that the task of constitutional
interpretation should-or, for some scholars, already does-fall to
popular majorities. Democracy replaces expert knowledge. If even
constitutional scholars are abandoning the idea of judges as legal
experts, it should come as no surprise that politicians and members of
the public are also attacking judicial authority.
Incidentally, in case you doubt that judges have more constitutional
expertise than do popular majorities, you might consider the following
facts. Only a quarter of Americans can name more than one of the rights

9. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
10. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999). See also RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST
MANIFESTO (1994); Robert C. Post, Foreword. Fashioningthe Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003); JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999); Jeremy
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against JudicialReview, 115 YALE L. J. 1346 (2006).
11. Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial
Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2004).
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protected by the First Amendment, but more than half can name at least
12
two of the cartoon characters from the television show The Simpsons.
Three times as many Americans can name two of the Seven Dwarfs as
can name two Supreme Court Justices. 13 And, despite the increasing
attacks on the federal judiciary, in the year 2000 only three percent
of
14
Justice.
Chief
the
was
Rehnquist
William
that
Americans knew
It is especially appropriate for me to critique popular
constitutionalism in this lecture. In 1914, William Howard Taft wrote
that he opposed measures that would take constitutional interpretation
away from "the deliberate judgment of trained lawyers" and instead give
them to "the fitful and uncertain vote of a probable minority of the
electorate
that cannot ...understand the frequently complicated
15
issues."'

Since Taft's day, matters have only gotten worse. Demands for
democratic decision-making are spreading beyond constitutional
interpretation to other legal contexts.
Administrative law scholarship provides a stark example of the
increasing flight from expertise. Administrative agencies are seen as a
constitutional anomaly because they seem to straddle the divide among
the three branches of government. They are created by Congress, but
are controlled more closely by the executive and ultimately overseen by
the courts. Moreover, the agencies themselves sometimes act like a
legislature by promulgating rules, and sometimes like a court by
deciding disputes. And, of course, they are not mentioned in the
Constitution and were not contemplated by its drafters-at least not in
their current form.
For these reasons, administrative law scholars have long struggled to
find models supporting the legitimacy of agencies. One of the earliest
models-the one that animated the New Deal architects of our modem
administrative state-relied on agency expertise. Congress makes
general policy decisions, but the appropriate implementation of those
decisions often depends on the particular factual context. In many cases,
scientific or other specialized knowledge is necessary to make the
appropriate trade-offs between, for example, clean air and consumer
costs, automobile safety and gas mileage, or the risks and benefits of a
new pharmaceutical product.
The New Dealers believed that
12. Aye, Carumba! U.S. FailsHistory, NEWSDAY, Mar. 2, 2006, at A15.
13. Reuters, We Know Bart, but Homer is Greek to Us, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at A 14.

14. Martin Gilens, PoliticalIgnoranceand Collective Policy Preferences, 95 AM. POL. SC. REV.
379, 393 (2001).
15. William Howard Taft, The Courts and the ProgressiveParty, SATURDAY EVENING POST,

Mar. 28, 1914, at 9, 47.
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administrative agencies could either provide that specialized knowledge
into their decisions evidence
themselves or evaluate and incorporate
16
presented to them by outside experts.
The expertise model of administrative agencies has, however, been
replaced by one that grounds agencies' legitimacy on democratic
accountability instead. Conventional wisdom-largely unchallenged
among administrative law scholars-places control over administrative
agencies in the president. Because the president is elected by the whole
nation, the theory goes, agency action is legitimate solely because it is
based on, and reflective of, majority will. Nothing else matters. Again,
democracy has replaced expertise.17
Identifying judges as experts, as I have done in this lecture and in
other work, is not intuitively obvious. But attributing expertise to
administrative agencies, especially in contexts involving scientific
knowledge, seems more natural. (For lawyers, law professors, and law
students, the difference may result in part from the fact that we have so
internalized legal expertise that we fail to recognize it as such.) That
difference, however, strengthens my argument. If even in administrative
law we envision a world in which popular majorities rather than experts
make these sorts of decisions, democracy has inserted itself deep into the
realm of knowledge.
My third example arguably takes us even deeper into that realm. It is
hard to imagine anything that depends more on specialized expertise
than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules)-as every first
year law student learns, sometimes painfully. The Rules and their
amendments are drafted by panels of experts: experienced judges,
litigators, and law professors. Each proposed change goes through
multiple levels of such expert committees before it reaches the Supreme
Court, whose justices, of course, are legal experts in their own right.
After the Supreme Court promulgates a new or amended Rule, it does
not take effect until Congress has had an opportunity to veto it. This8
process, authorized in broad outline by the federal Rules Enabling Act,'
is designed to take full advantage of expert knowledge in a context that
cries out for such expertise.
But even here we see signs of encroaching majoritarianism. Civil
procedure scholarship may be at a crossroads, one through which both

16. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (describing administrative law scholarship).
17. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:Arbitrarinessand Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003) (describing and critiquing presidential control
model).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
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constitutional and administrative scholarship have already passed. Most
of the current scholarship critical of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
focuses on the problem of judicial discretion and its potential for
arbitrariness, inconsistency, and discrimination. 19 That may well be a
problem we should address (although I have written elsewhere that we
have overlooked the need for greater judicial discretion in some
litigation contexts).20 My purpose here is not to evaluate these critiques
but to place them in the context of the move from expertise to
democratic control of knowledge.
These complaints about arbitrariness and judicial discretion echo
earlier generations of scholarship in constitutional and administrative
law. The earliest critiques of the expertise model of administrative
agencies focused specifically on procedural defects that allowed
arbitrary agency decision-making.
And well before popular
constitutionalism
rejected
judicial
interpretation
wholesale,
constitutional scholars criticized particular cases and doctrines and
looked for ways to constrain judicial discretion. In both fields, this
tailored criticism eventually gave way to a broader rejection of
expertise. Will the same thing happen in civil procedure scholarship?
I offer here one small piece of evidence that civil procedure
scholarship is heading in that direction. One of the country's leading
scholars in both civil procedure and constitutional law has recently
published an article suggesting that the Rules Enabling Act is
unconstitutional. 2 ' Why? He argues that because procedure inevitably
affects substantive rights, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ought to
be enacted by Congress rather than promulgated by the Supreme Court.
In other words-although he does not put it this way--democracy
should replace expertise in crafting the technical rules governing
litigation.
His arguments are well-reasoned and plausible. Some will find them
persuasive. But the article rests, at bottom, on the same mind-set that
underlies popular constitutionalism and the presidential control model in
administrative law: Political legitimacy depends entirely on democratic
pedigree rather than on substantive validity. Once we make that move,
19. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513 (2006);
Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion,78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561 (2003); Judith Resnik,
ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
20. Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of FederalAppellate Courts, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97 (2006).
21. Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, The Rules EnablingAct, and the
Politicizationof the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303
(2006). See also Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the FederalRules: An Essay on
What's Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707 (2006); Tidmarsh, supra note 19.
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whether in constitutional law, administrative law, or civil procedure,
expert knowledge becomes essentially irrelevant-and maybe even
suspect-because it is the product of, in Professor Kramer's words, "a
trained elite of judges and lawyers.' 2 2
In rejecting the democratization of procedure, I can once again turn to
Taft for support. In his commencement address to the University of
Cincinnati College of Law in 1914, twenty years before the Rules
Enabling Act, Taft proposed that "[t]he rules of procedure should be
completely in control of the Supreme Court or a Council of Judges
appointed by the Supreme Court., 23 Congress eventually implemented
his suggestion, but the democratization of knowledge is now pushing us
away from it.
I hope that these examples-from Wikipedia to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which is quite a distance-illustrate both the breadth
and the contours of the phenomenon that I am describing.
My second task in this lecture is more speculative: I want to explore
the origins of the flight from expertise. In particular, why has legal
scholarship-itself the product of trained experts-sought to
democratize the production of knowledge?
I suggest that the flight from expertise is a domestication of the postmodernism that flourished in legal scholarship in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Post-modernists, in and out of the legal academy, denied
the possibility of objective knowledge altogether. 24 They argued that
knowledge and reality were socially constructed by those in power. This
raw social constructionism, however, is not just absurd, but ultimately
dangerous: As Dan Farber and I argued in a 1997 book, following social
constructionism to its logical2 5 conclusions necessarily leads to antiSemitism and authoritarianism.
Post-modernist social constructionism in this strong form has faded
from legal scholarship. Nevertheless, I see strong traces of it in the
current movement.
22. Kramer, supra note 10, at 7.
23. William Howard Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure,5 KY. L. J. 3, 14
(1916).
24. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 54 (1987); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO.
L.J. 1711, 1721 (1995); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the
Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803,
819 (1994); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1555 (1993); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 806; Lucinda
M. Finley, Breaking Women 's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal
Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989).
25. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON
TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997).
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Consider the underlying premise of social constructionism: that
knowledge is constructed by powerful elites in order to maintain and
consolidate their power. If the corollary is that there is no such thing as
objective knowledge, we arrive at a post-modem paradox. Whatever
knowledge the post-modernists themselves are urging us to accept is
also socially constructed, and we have no particular reason to prefer it to
any other form of knowledge.
Watering down social constructionism into a democracy-based flight
from expertise, however, eliminates the paradox and makes the
arguments less absurd and more palatable. The alternative to knowledge
created by elites and experts is no longer just some other socially
constructed knowledge, but is now "real" knowledge with an additional
patina of political legitimacy because of its democratic origins. Like
social constructionism, then, the democratization of knowledge is an
attack on expertise and objective measures of truth, but in a much more
consumer-friendly package. Domesticating post-modernism in this way
has allowed it to spread well beyond academics, as the original postmodernism never could.
There is an historical irony in all of this. The post-modern movement
in legal academia can trace its roots back to the legal realism of the early
twentieth century. Legal realists rejected the formalist notion that law
embodies neutral general principles, which both derive from and
determine the results in individual cases. Instead, the realists argued that
legal principles are indeterminate, and their application could always
vary with the substantive views of the particular judge.2 6
But the legal realists-unlike the post-modernists--did not believe
that the indeterminacy of law left the judicial enterprise as a pure
exercise of raw power. The realists instead put their faith in expertise
and empirical data as constraints on adjudication. 27 Legal rules might be
indeterminate, but knowledge itself was not-and knowledge did not
depend on popular democracy. Post-modernists eventually applied the
realists' indeterminacy thesis beyond legal doctrines to knowledge itself,
leaving behind what they considered to be the legal realists' naive
reliance on objective empiricism.
For the post-modem social
constructionists, everything was indeterminate.

26. For descriptions of legal realism, see, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1995); FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 25; LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); G.
EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (1978).
27. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE

(1995).
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And now, it seems, we have come full circle. Today's popular
constitutionalists and their ilk have themselves abandoned the realists'
adherence to legal indeterminacy-after all, they criticize the courts for
reaching incorrect results-but have retained the post-modernist
skepticism of expertise. The legal realists counted on expertise to
remedy the dangers of legal indeterminacy, while today's democratizers
find legal certainty by substituting majority will for expertise.
We arrive at last at the fundamental normative question: Is the
wholesale substitution of majority will for expertise likely to be
beneficial or harmful to our constitutional democracy? In the rest of my
time this morning, I will give three reasons-one each from political
theory, cognitive psychology, and history-to suspect that it might be
more harmful than beneficial.
First, political theory: Our Constitution does not create, and was not
designed to create, a pure democracy. A regime in which majorities can
directly translate their every wish into law is, if examined closely,
unappealing and even dangerous, because it is likely to result in
intolerance and enforced conformity. Unless we are willing to ignore
the rights of political minorities, we must limit majority tyranny in some
way.
In our constitutional democracy, majority will is curbed in two
familiar ways: by various mechanisms that filter the popular will, and by
explicit prohibitions on legislative enactments.
Instead of referendums, we have representatives-and, especially in
the case of the Senate, those representatives are not supposed to serve
purely as faithful agents of the people's will but to exercise deliberate
judgment and (in the words of James Madison) "protect the people
against the transient impressions into which they themselves might be
led.",28 Roger Sherman, another influential founder, suggested that
"when the people have chosen a representative, it is his duty to meet
others from the different parts of the Union, and consult, and agree with
them to such acts as are for the general benefit of the whole
community. 29 Indeed, when the Bill of Rights was debated in the
House of Representatives in 1789, the House overwhelmingly rejected
an amendment that would have given citizens the right to "instruct" their
representatives.30

28. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 193 (Ohio
University Press 1966).
29. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 735 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (Debate in the House of Representatives,
Aug. 15, 1789)).
30. Id. at 733 (motion), 747 (vote; 41-10 against).
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Other structural aspects of our Constitution incorporate similar
filtering mechanisms.
The electoral college interposes what was
originally meant to be another layer of deliberation into the election of
the president. The federal judiciary is intentionally insulated from
popular accountability in order to give judges, in Bickel's famous words,
"the capacity31to appeal to men's better natures, [and] to call forth their
aspirations."
What these various constitutional structures suggest is that the theory
of representation underlying our constitutional democracy is not one of
pure agency but rather relies on deliberation and the independent
exercise of judgment. It is ironic, then, that those who clamor for
democratic decision-making sometimes identify the president or the
legislature as the appropriately democratic decision-maker. They have
apparently lost sight of the political theory of the Constitution not only
in calling for democracy to replace expertise but also in their
characterization of the role of the elected branches.
In addition to the structural mechanisms that prevent popular
majorities from directly implementing their preferences, the Constitution
provides an even more important (and probably more familiar) limit:
Substantive prohibitions in the Bill of Rights and elsewhere place some
majority preferences out of bounds. These safeguards against majority
tyranny would be of little use if-as popular constitutionalists urgetheir interpretation were the province of the majority itself. Instead, our
constitutional regime has always tried to separate law from politics and
leave legal interpretation-including constitutional interpretation-to
legal experts. It is this tradition that the flight from expertise rejects.
It is no accident that the political theory underlying the Constitution
supposes that some decisions should be made by experts rather than by
purely democratic means. The founding generation, strongly influenced
by the Enlightenment and its reliance on reason rather than fiat, believed
that government was a science.32 As such, it could be done well or
badly, and they tried to incorporate the best science of their day into the
Constitution.
Madison, for example, spent a good part of 1786
preparing for the constitutional convention by reading two trunkloads of
books on "ancient & modem confederacies," which Thomas Jefferson
had sent him from Paris. He took copious notes, closing his discussion

31. BICKEL, supranote 9, at 26.
32. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2005); DREw R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE
REPUBLICAN LEGACY (1989); FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985); JACK N. RAKOvE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS
IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
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of each regime with a list of its constitutional defects.33
Of course, just because the founding generation thought that the
science of politics should leaven democracy does not necessarily mean
that we must agree. We have to ask whether-in the context of
constitutional interpretation, agency decision-making, or the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-experts are likely to make better choices than
those produced by popular majorities.
The first problem is to define what we mean by "better choices." The
scholarly literature seems to have two different definitions in mind
(although neither is made explicit).
Some scholars-too many, to my mind-seem to focus only on
whether they agree or disagree with the substantive choices that the
courts make. Half the majoritarian scholars applaud Lawrence v.
Texas 34 (which invalidated anti-sodomy laws) and Grutter v.
Bollinger35(which upheld affirmative action), but lament United States v.
Morrison36 (which struck down the Violence Against Women Act) and
Washington v. Glucksberg37 (which upheld a ban on assisted suicide).
The other half take exactly the opposite position. It seems that many
popular constitutionalists advocate taking the constitution away from the
courts only when they do not like the courts' interpretations. In other
words, some fair-weather friends of the Warren Court have become
popular constitutionalists in the last fifteen years-and some critics of
the Warren Court have developed a previously undiscovered fondness
for judicial activism. This is not a principled attack on judicial
discretion; it is a political shooting match.
Aside from the inherent inconsistency of this approach, evaluating
judges by whether we agree with substantive outcomes is also unlikely
to produce consensus. In the constitutional context, citizens simply
disagree on the best outcome; in the procedural context, factors such as
efficiency, cost, predictability, and finality must be considered but do
not always align with ideal outcomes; and administrative law suffers
from both problems.
Enter the other common definition of "better": more democratic and
therefore more politically legitimate. To avoid evaluating outcomes,
some scholars maintain that because the legislative and executive
branches are more politically accountable than the judiciary, the
decisions of the former are necessarily better than those of the latter.
33. RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 42-43.
34. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
35. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

36. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
37. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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This approach begs the question, of course. My contention this morning
is that democratic accountability is a poor substitute for expertise.
Merely asserting that democracy is-or should be-our only value is
essentially a statement of personal opinion in favor of the
democratization movement, not an argument.
In fact, empirical studies in the field of cognitive psychology have
identified certain factors that improve decision-making, by experts and
non-experts. The studies focus on decisions for which we can evaluate
the soundness of the decision by looking at its outcome-such as chess
games and predictions of future events-but the results can help us in
the contexts I am exploring, in which we cannot use the outcome to
evaluate the decision-making process.
These studies find that decision-makers are more likely to be
successful if they satisfy four crucial criteria: if they take into account
opposing evidence and arguments; if they engage in critical thinking; if
they have enough training and experience to identify recurring patterns;
and if they look at many factors in order to reach a principle of decision
rather than imposing a pre-set principle of decision on the existing
factors.3 8
That description of good decision-making should sound very familiar,
especially to lawyers and law students. It is essentially a list of the
professional skills that are taught in law school and are the hallmarks of
a successful lawyer. Indeed, it is a description of the basic skills that
most fields of study impart to their students, from physicists to
historians. One can become an expert even without formal training, but
the fact that formal training in most fields stresses the pre-requisites for
good decision-making should lead us to conclude that experts are more
likely to make good decisions than non-experts.
Regarding legal decisions in particular, the skills that serve law
students and lawyers so well are reinforced further by the structure and
function of the judiciary. Judges-who have already internalized these
traits from law school, and, we hope, a successful legal practice-are
thrust into a collegial, deliberative, incremental, repetitive, and casespecific decision-making milieu. Every discussion with a colleague,
every opinion that has to be written and rewritten because of arguments
38. See, e.g., JOHN R. ANDERSON, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (2d ed.
1985); PHILIP TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: How GOOD IS IT? HOw CAN WE KNOW?
(2005); Michelene T.H. Chi et al., Categorizationand Representation of Physics Problems by Experts
and Novices, 5 COGNITIVE SCI. 121 (1981); Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the
Effects ofAccountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999); Alan Lesgold et al., Expertise in a Complex
Skill: Diagnosing X-ray Pictures,in THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE 229-60 (Michelene T.H. Chi et al. eds.,
1988); Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Reasoning Independently of PriorBelief and Individual
Differences in Actively Open-Minded Thinking, 89 J. Ed. Psych. 342 (1997).
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by counsel or other judges, every case that depends on precedent and
abilities that the studies identify as
common law reasoning, sharpens the
39
improving expert decision-making.
This does not mean that judges (or other experts) never make
mistakes. Nor does it mean that all experts are equal or that ordinary
citizens cannot make many decisions as well as experts. But it does
suggest that on average, we are likely to get better results from a panel
of trained experts than from a survey of ordinary citizens.
So what is the role of democracy in our constitutional regime? It is to
make value choices: the choices that depend not on expertise but on
policy preferences. The popularly elected branches decide, for example,
whether to go to war. But if we want to wage war successfully, we ask
military experts and if we want to wage war within constitutional
bounds we ask legal experts. In both cases, we might not like what the
experts tell us-and their decisions might end up preventing us from
acting as we would prefer-but putting those questions to a popular vote
is a recipe for disaster.
I will close with two such disasters, one historical and one currently
threatened, both in the context of scientific rather than legal expertise.
Scientific knowledge provides wonderful insights here for two reasons.
First, it is falsifiable in ways that legal knowledge is not. And second,
we can juxtapose scientific expertise against a variety of political
methods for producing knowledge-we are not limited to democracies.
So what happens when the production of scientific knowledge is
removed from the hands of experts and instead placed into the realm of
politics? The Soviet Union tried to do just that with the science of
genetics during the first half of the twentieth century. 40 By the 1930s,
the basic principles of genetic inheritance were well-established
(although the exact mechanisms were still unknown). For our purposes,
the most important principle is that acquired characteristics are not

39. For descriptions ofjudges and judging along these lines, see, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN
GOOD FAITH (1992); SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); Suzanna Sherry, Politics and Judgment, 70 MO. L. REV. 973
(2005); Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character,38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2003).
40. For information on Lysenko and Lysenkoism discussed in this and the next three paragraphs,
see, for example, LOREN R. GRAHAM, SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE SOVIET UNION (1972); JULIAN
HUXLEY, SOVIET GENETICS AND WORLD SCIENCE: LYSENKO AND THE MEANING OF HEREDITY (1949);
DAVID JORAVSKY, THE LYSENKO AFFAIR (1970); Richard Lewontin & Richard Levins, The Problem of
Lysenkoism, in THE RADICALISATION OF SCIENCE (Hilary Rose & Steven Rose eds., 1976); ZHORES A.
MEDVEDEV, THE RISE AND FALL OF T.D. LYSENKO (I. Michael Lemer trans., 1969); VALERY N.
SOYFER, LYSENKO AND THE TRAGEDY OF SOVIET SCIENCE (Leo Gruliow & Rebecca Gruliow trans.,
1994); CONWAY ZIRKLE, EVOLUTION, MARXIAN BIOLOGY, AND THE SOCIAL SCENE (1959).
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inheritable: If you cut off an animal's tail, its offspring will not be born
tailless. The theory that acquired characteristics are inheritable is
known as Lamarckianism, after eighteenth century French scientist JeanBaptiste Lamarck, and in the nineteenth century it was a respectable
scientific theory. For example, Charles Darwin, lacking a mechanism
for inheritance that would not be discovered until after his death, was
arguably (although uncomfortably) a Lamarckian.
By the early
twentieth century, however, Mendelian genetics had disproved
Lamarckianism to the satisfaction of all reputable scientists.
The Soviets, however, had two problems with Mendelian genetics:
First, Marx himself had believed in the inheritability of acquired
characteristics-no surprise, since that theory was scientifically viable at
the time Marx wrote. But to the Soviets, to repudiate Lamarckianism
was to repudiate Marx. Moreover, Marxist principles of "dialectical
materialism" and of using nature for the benefit of the people require
that humans be able to use science to mold themselves and their
surroundings to fit the "brave new world" that the Soviets were trying to
create. The principles of Mendelian genetics were thought inconsistent
with these goals.
Stalin found a solution to this scientific dilemma in the person of a
Soviet scientist named Trofim Lysenko. Lysenko put forth his own
theory of Lamarckian genetics, denying the existence of genes and
affirming the inheritability of acquired characteristics.
Stalin was
delighted with both Lysenko's scientific theories and his claimed ability
to use them to increase agricultural production. The Communist Party
endorsed Lysenkoism, using the many tools at its disposal-probably
including murder-to eliminate the study of Mendelian genetics in the
Soviet Union.
The results were disastrous. Not only did Lysenko's agricultural
programs fail-adding to the mass starvation across the Soviet Unionbut by silencing his critics, he was able almost single-handedly to erase
decades of Soviet scientific progress in the area of genetics. It was not
until at least the mid-1960s that Lysenkoism was finally discredited in
the Soviet Union.
You may think that this example is far afield from a lecture on
constitutional law, even one on democracy and the death of knowledge.
But there is a parallel much closer to home.
Just as the principles of Mendelian genetics are now universally
accepted, scientists uniformly accept the core of evolutionary theory:
that natural biological processes are responsible for changes in
populations across generations, including both greater complexity in
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form and function and ultimately the development of new species. 4
Although there are disputes about the exact mechanisms by which
evolution occurs-and the relative importance of such factors as natural
selection and genetic drift-not a single reputable scientist denies that
humans evolved from other species by these natural mechanisms. For
all that it is commonly called a "theory," evolution is as much a fact as
the theory that Earth orbits the sun rather than the other way around.
But there are many non-scientists who would deny the fact of
evolution, primarily on the basis of religious beliefs. According to a
recent poll, 51% of Americans reject evolution, believing instead that
God created humans in their present form. 42 These non-experts claim a
democratic right to determine what counts as knowledge. Despite
uniform opposition by the scientific community, they demand that
public education teach evolution not as fact but as one theory among
many, and that schools thus portray their religiously-based views as
alternative scientific explanation.
The democratic structure of our public education system gives these
ideologues an opportunity to spread their ignorance. So far, the
countermajoritarian judiciary has held the line, recognizing that
creationists and their successors are attempting to substitute religion for
science.
But the further we proceed with the democratization of
knowledge and the flight from expertise, the more credible the antievolution claims will be. And just as Lysenko ensured that generations
of Soviet scientists lagged behind their western contemporaries in
scientific knowledge, capitulating to the democratizers on evolution will
produce a generation of Americans ignorant of basic scientific facts.
Perhaps as ominous is the prospect that the democratization of
knowledge will distort legal principles the same way that Lysenkoism
distorted scientific principles. Democratization thus threatens to turn
American law into an institution as dysfunctional as the Soviet scientific
academy.
So, yes, there can be such a thing as too much democracy, when it
starts us down the road to the death of knowledge.

41. See generally DOUGLAS F. FUTUYMA, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (Sinauer Assoc. 3d ed.

1997).
42. CBSNews.com, Poll: Majority Reject Evolution, www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/10/22/
opinion/polls/main965223.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
43. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ.,
185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist., 400 F. Supp.2d 707 (M.D. Pa.
2005). See also EUGENIE CAROL SCOTT, EVOLUTION VS. CREATIONISM: AN INTRODUCTION (2004); Jay
D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public
Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751 (2003).
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